Appellant's Opening Brief
[26 August 1997]

GA asks this Court to reject the Judgment in this case and
do Justice to bring Scientology to take this opportunity.


From: armstrong@ntonline.com (gerry armstrong)
Newsgroups: alt.religion.scientology
Subject: Appellant's Opening Brief
Date: 26 Aug 1997
Organization: Rapidnet Technologies Internet





CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
                                     
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

GERALD ARMSTRONG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal No. A075027

Marin County Superior Court No. 157680 

 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF


Gerald Armstrong
C/O George W. Abbott, Esquire
2245-B Meridian Boulevard
P.O. Box 98
Minden, Nevada 89423-0098
Defendant and Appellant
In Propria Persona
(702)782-2302

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.INTRODUCTION................................................-1-

II. ARMSTRONG'S HISTORY WITH SCIENTOLOGY......................-3-

     A. Pre-Settlement........................................-4-

     B. The Settlement........................................-7-

     C. From Settlement to First Response....................-10-

     D. Fair Game After Armstrong's First Response...........-14-

     E. Armstrong's Actions..................................-17-

     F. Scientology's Enforcement Litigation.................-19-

III. ARGUMENT................................................-29-

     A. There is a Triable Issue as to Duress................-29-

     B. There is a Triable Issue as to Fraud.................-32-

     C. There is a Triable Issue as to Justification.........-34-

     D. The Settlement Agreement Obstructs Justice...........-36-

     E. There is a Triable Issue as to the Validity 
        of the Liquidated Damages Provision..................-41-

     F. The Settlement Agreement Violates
        Freedom of Speech....................................-45-

     G. The Settlement Agreement Violates
        the Thirteenth Amendment.............................-47-

     H. The Settlement Agreement Violates 
        Freedom of Religion..................................-48-

IV. CONCLUSION...............................................-50-
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 307, 319......................................-46-

Scientology v. Armstrong, (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 283 Cal. Rptr. 917......................-13-

Civ. Code, Sec.1671, Subd (b).............................-24,41-

I.INTRODUCTION

     This is an appeal from a Marin County Superior Court judgment
obtained by plaintiff Church of Scientology International,
hereinafter (also with other components of the global Scientology
organization) "Scientology" or "Scn," against defendant Gerald
Armstrong, hereinafter "Armstrong" or "GA," pursuant to a series of
summary adjudication motions. The judgment (Clerk's Transcript on
Appeal, hereinafter "CT," 9783-85) includes a monetary award of
$300,000 in "liquidated damages," $334,671.75 in costs, and an
order of permanent injunction against GA. The judgment and
injunction (CT 9786-94) are the result of the enforcement by way of
breach of contract action of a 1986 "Mutual Release of All Claims
and Settlement Agreement," hereinafter "SA" (CT 116-31) which was
to end then existing Los Angeles Superior Court litigation between
Scn and GA. The SA requires, inter alia, that GA not mention Scn,
his knowledge thereof or experiences therein(CT 121-3), not
voluntarily assist or advise Scn's litigation opponents including
governmental agencies (CT 125,6; 128), and avoid service of process
(CT 125,6). The SA also included a liquidated damages provision of
$50,000 (CT 123) for any such mention or assistance by GA. Scn
claims that GA violated the SA some 50 times, which are listed in
the injunction, between 1991 and 1995. (CT 9787-91)

     The order of injunction states:
     "[GA], his agents, employees, and persons acting in
     concert or conspiracy with him are restrained and
     enjoined from doing directly or indirectly any of the
     following:
          1.   Voluntarily assisting any person (not a
     government organ or entity) intending to make, intending
     to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending to
     litigate a claim, regarding such claim or regarding
     pressing, arbitrating, or litigating it, against any of
     the following persons or entities: 
     -    [The Church of Scientology International, Church of
     Scientology of California, Religious Technology Center,
     Church of Spiritual Technology, all Scientology and
     Scientology affiliated Churches, organizations and
     entities, Author Services, Inc., and all their officers,
     directors, agents, representatives, employees,
     volunteers, successors, assigns and legal counsel;]
     -    The Estate of L. Ron Hubbard, its executor,
     beneficiaries, heirs, representatives, and legal counsel;
     and/or
     -    Mary Sue Hubbard;
     (Hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
     Beneficiaries");
          2.   Voluntarily assisting any person (not a
     government organ or entity) defending a claim, intending
     to defend a claim, intending to defend an arbitration, or
     intending to defend any claim being pressed, made,
     arbitrated or litigated by any of the Beneficiaries,
     regarding such claim or regarding defending, arbitrating,
     or litigating against it;
          3.   Voluntarily assisting any person (not a
     government organ or entity) arbitrating, or litigating
     adversely to any of the Beneficiaries;
          4.   Facilitating in any manner the creation,
     publication, broadcast, writing, filming audio recording,
     video recording, electronic recording or reproduction of
     any kind of any book, article, film, television program,
     radio program, treatment, declaration, screenplay or
     other literary, artistic or documentary work of any kind
     which discusses, refers to or mentions Scientology, the
     Church, and/or any of the Beneficiaries;
          5.   Discussing with anyone, not a member of
     Armstrong's immediate family or his attorney,
     Scientology, the Church, and/or any of the
     Beneficiaries."

     GA contends that his signature was obtained by Scn on the SA
by duress, fraud and the compromise of his then attorney. GA
contends that all his alleged breaches of the SA were in response
to and in self-defense against Scn's post-settlement attacks on
him, and that as such his actions were legally justified. He
contends that the purpose and function of the SA and its
enforcement are obstruction of justice, and as such are against
public policy. He contends that the SA and the injunction
impermissibly violate his Constitutional rights to freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, due process
and freedom from slavery; and impermissibly eliminate his
litigant's, clergyman-penitent, therapist-patient and doctor-
patient privileges. GA contends that the liquidated damages
provision impermissibly acts as punishment, that the amount has no
reasonable relationship to Scn's actual damages for his alleged
breaches, and that there are sufficient disputed facts concerning
circumstances at the time of the settlement of the Los Angeles
action to make imposition of monetary damages and disposition of
the case by summary judgment clear judicial error. GA contends that
there is also a triable issue of fact as to the intentions of the
settling parties regarding Scn's being bound by the same silence
conditions. Finally, GA contends that the court below erred in not
considering his defenses and not considering the miscarriage of
justice which would result from its erroneous judgment.

     GA is not an attorney and has no present access to published
California and US laws and appellate opinions.  He was represented
by competent counsel throughout most of the litigation in the court
below, and he relies on and incorporates herein his counsel's
memoranda of points and authorities in his oppositions, with all
arguments and citations therein, to Scn's various summary
adjudication motions (CT 8252-75; 8243-51; 3875-98; 9349-63) and in
his motion for reconsideration and reply. (CT 9046-62; 9509-18) 

II. ARMSTRONG'S HISTORY WITH SCIENTOLOGY

     Unless otherwise indicated, all facts in this section are from
GA's Separate Statements of Disputed and Undisputed Facts in
Opposition to Summary Adjudication Motions (CT 8276-410; 8411-553)
and GA's Evidence in Support of Oppositions to Summary Adjudication
Motions (CT 5871-8242), all properly before the trial court. Any
document cited to is identified only in the initial citation. Facts
stated in the Separate Statements are designated (SS (no.), CT
(no.). Certain documents contained in GA's Evidence before the
court below, which are inexplicably missing from the Clerk's
Transcript, and are designated "Missing."

A. Pre-Settlement

     GA was inside Scn from 1969 through 1981. From 1971 until he
left the organization he was a member of the Sea Organization, the
highly dedicated upper echelon of Scn, and worked for Scn founder
and director L. Ron Hubbard. GA's last position inside Scn involved
assembling an archive of Hubbard's personal documents and providing
research assistance and copies of the archive documents to a writer
Omar Garrison who had been contracted to produce Hubbard's
biography. Through his study of the papers in his possession GA
came to see that Hubbard and his organization had continuously lied
about Hubbard's past, credentials and accomplishments. GA attempted
to get the organization to correct the lies, but his efforts were
rejected and he was ordered to a "security check," a Scn
interrogation using its lie detector, also called an E-meter. GA
saw that his trust, which he had placed in Hubbard and Scn for more
than 12 years, had no meaning, and that the frauds perpetrated
about Hubbard's life would continue; and as a result GA left the
organization. (Decision, 6/20/84, Scientology v. Armstrong,
hereinafter, "Armstrong I,"LASC No. 420153, CT 5960-70)

     Shortly after leaving, GA became the target of Scn's "Fair
Game Doctrine," which permits individuals designated as "enemies,"
also called "Suppressive Persons," hereinafter "SP's," to be
"deprived of property, injured by any means by any Scientologist...
tricked, sued, or lied to or destroyed." (Scn Policy, CT 6934; SS
1A, CT 8412) GA says that "fair game" is the name given by Hubbard
to his philosophy of opportunistic hatred directed at anybody he
didn't like. GA observes that over Hubbard's adult life he used
hatred and acts which flow therefrom (lying, cheating, stealing,
compromising, entrapping, obstructing, bullying, blackmailing,
destroying) as the solution to his problems. (GA Declaration
12/25/90, CT 6139,40) Scn declared GA an SP, published documents
accusing him falsely of crimes and high crimes including
promulgating false information about Hubbard and Scn (SP Declares,
CT 7354-7; SS 1A, CT 8416,7), and seized photographs GA possessed.
Fearing that his wife's and his life were in danger GA, who had
extensive knowledge of covert intelligence operations carried out
by Scn against SPs, obtained from Garrison documents GA believed he
would need to defend himself against Scn, and sent them to
attorneys who had agreed to represent him in his defense. (CT
5972,3; SS 1A, CT 8412) One of the attorneys was Michael Flynn,
whom Scn considered its foremost lawyer enemy. (CT 5958) 

     Scn filed its Armstrong I suit against GA in August, 1982 for
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and invasion of privacy. The
documents GA sent to his attorneys were ordered to be delivered to
the LASC Clerk where they remained until the 1986 settlement. Scn
also hired individuals who followed and surveilled GA, assaulted
him, struck him bodily with a car, and attempted to involve him in
a freeway accident. The same individuals spied in GA's windows,
created disturbances and upset his neighbors. (CT 5973,4; SS 1A, CT
8412) GA filed a cross-complaint against Scn for, inter alia, fraud
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

     Scn's suit, from which the cross-complaint was severed, was
tried without a jury by Judge Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr. in the
spring of 1984, resulting in a decision for GA. Judge Breckenridge
found that Scn and Mary Sue Hubbard had unclean hands and that GA's
actions in sending the documents to his attorneys were reasonable
and justified because he reasonably believed he was the target of
"fair game." (CT 5948-59; SS 126, CT 8517) The Judge stated:
     "[GA] did what he did, because he believed that his life,
     physical and mental well being, as well as that of his
     wife were threatened because the organization was aware
     of what he knew about the life of LRH (Hubbard), the
     secret machinations and financial activities of the
     Church, and his dedication to the truth.  He believed
     that the only way he could defend himself, physically as
     well as from harassing lawsuits, was to take from Omar
     Garrison those materials which would support and
     corroborate everything he had been saying about LRH and
     the Church, or refute the allegations made against him in
     the [SP] Declare.  He believed that the only way he could
     be sure that the documents would remain secure for his
     future use was to send them to his attorneys, and that to
     protect himself, he had to go public so as to minimize
     the risk that LRH, the Church or any of their agents
     would do him physical harm." (CT 5952)

     Judge Breckenridge condemned Scn's "fair game" policy:
     "In addition to violating and abusing its own members
     civil rights, the organization over the years with its
     "Fair Game" doctrine has harassed and abused those
     persons not in the Church whom it perceives as enemies.
     The organization clearly is schizophrenic and paranoid,
     and this bizarre combination seems to be a reflection of
     its founder LRH. The evidence portrays a man who has been
     virtually a pathological liar when it comes to his
     history, background and achievements. The writings and
     documents in evidence additionally reflect his egoism,
     greed, avarice, lust for power, and vindictiveness and
     aggressiveness against persons perceived by him to be
     disloyal or hostile." (CT 5955,6)

     Judge Breckenridge condemned Scn's abuse of its participants'
auditing or psychotherapy records:
          "culling supposedly confidential "P.C. folders or files"
          to obtain information for purposes of intimidation and/or
          harassment is repugnant and outrageous." (CT 5958,9)

     Judge Breckenridge commented on GA's credibility:
     "the court finds the testimony of [GA and 7 other named
     defense witnesses] to be credible, extremely persuasive,
     and the defense of privilege or justification established
     and corroborated by this evidence. [ ] In all critical
     and important matters, their testimony was precise,
     accurate and rang true." (CT 5954)

     Judge Breckenridge also stated that:
     "[GA] and his counsel are free to speak or communicate
     upon any of [GA's} recollections or his life as a
     Scientologist or the contents of any exhibit received in
     evidence or marked for identification and not
     specifically ordered sealed." (CT 5950)
     The decision was entered as a Judgment and Scn appealed.

     Following the 1984 decision and until the 1986 settlement Scn
continued its fair game attacks on GA which included at least these
acts:  attempted entrapment; illegal videotaping; filing false
criminal charges against him with the Los Angeles District
Attorney; filing false criminal charges against him with the Boston
office of the FBI; filing false declarations to bring contempt of
court proceedings against him on three occasions; obtaining
perjured affidavits from English private investigators who had
harassed him in London, England in 1984, accusing him of
distributing "sealed" documents; international dissemination of
Scientology publications falsely accusing him of, inter alia,
crimes, including crimes against humanity; culling and
disseminating information from his supposedly confidential auditing
or psychotherapy file. (SS 1A, CT 8413-8; GA Declaration, 3/16/92,
CT 6910-1; GA Declaration, 9/15/95, CT 5897-9; LAPD Officer
Rodriguez letter re eavesdropping, 11/7/84, CT 6941; LAPD Chief
Gates Announcement, 4/23/85, CT 6942; LA DA letter, 4/25/86, CT
6943-55; "Freedom," 1985, CT 7060-71; Scn Directive, 9/20/84, CT
7119,20); GA Declaration, 11/1/86, CT 6411-47. Scn calls falsehoods
used to destroy reputation or public belief in a person, "black
propaganda," or "black PR." (SS 1A, CT 8413; Scn policies 11/21/72
and 11/5/71, CT 7376-87) Scn also calls black PR "dead agent," and
documents used for black PR purposes "dead agent documents" or "DA
docs." See also Scn's Request for Judicial Notice, GA Declaration,
2/22/94, (CT 5580-93; GA Declaration, 2/20/94, CT 5624-39; SS 1A)

      GA's attorney Michael Flynn was the target of Scientology's
fair game from 1979 through the time of the signing of the
settlement agreements. Fair game acts against Flynn included
infiltrating his office, paying known criminals to testify falsely
against him, suing him and his office some fifteen times, framing
him with the forgery of a $2,000,000 check, and an international
black PR campaign. (SS 1B, CT 8418-20; GA Declaration, 9/9/95, CT
8245; CT 6125; GA Declaration, 1/13/94, CT 6967,8; "Juggernaut"
Intelligence Eval, 9/13/81, CT 6310-6324; Jonathan Atack
Declaration, 4/9/95, CT 7964; Settlement Agreement between Flynn
and clients 6938,9 (signed version at CT 5483); CT 5899,900).

B. The Settlement

     At the beginning of December, 1986 an agreement was reached
between Flynn and Scn to settle the cases in which he was involved
as counsel or party. GA was then working for Flynn in his Boston
office, was aware that settlement talks were occurring, and had an
agreement with Flynn on a monetary amount to settle his cross-
complaint, then set for trial in March, 1987. GA was flown to Los
Angeles, as were several other clients with claims against the
organization, to participate in a global settlement. Only after his
arrival in LA was he shown a copy of the SA and other documents
which he was expected to sign. (CT 6911,2; 6125,6; 5900,1)

     Upon reading the SA, GA was shocked and heartsick. He told
Flynn that the condition of strict confidentiality and silence with
respect to his experiences with Scn, since they involved over
seventeen years of his life, was impossible. GA told Flynn that the
liquidated damages provision was outrageous; that pursuant to the
settlement agreement he would have to pay $50,000.00 if he told a
doctor or psychologist about his experiences from those years, or
if he put on a resume what positions he had held during his Scn
years. He told Flynn that the requirements of non-amenability to
service of process and non-cooperation with persons or
organizations adverse to the organization were obstructive of
justice. He told Flynn that agreeing to leave Scn's appeal of the
Armstrong I decision and not respond to any subsequent appeals was
unfair to the courts and all the people who had been helped by the
decision. He told Flynn that an affidavit the organization was
demanding that he sign along with the SA was false. GA told Flynn
that he was being asked to betray everything and everyone he had
fought for against Scn injustice. (CT 6911-2; 6126,7; 5901)

     In answer to GA's objections Flynn said that the silence and
liquidated damages clauses, and anything which called for
obstruction of justice were "not worth the paper they're printed
on." Flynn told GA this a number of times and in a number of ways;
"You can't contract away your Constitutional rights; "the
conditions are unenforceable." Flynn said that he had advised Scn
attorneys that those conditions in the SA were not worth the paper
they were printed on, but that they, nevertheless, insisted on
their inclusion in the SA and would not agree to any changes. Flynn
said that Scn's attorneys had promised that the affidavit, which
all the settling litigants were signing, would only be used by Scn
if GA began attacking it after the settlement; and if GA did not
attack Scn the affidavit "would never see the light of day." Flynn
pointed out to GA the clauses concerning his release of all claims
against Scn to date and its release of all claims against GA to
date and said that they were the essential elements of the
settlement and were what Scn was paying for. (CT 6912,3; 6127;
5901; SS 116; CT 8509)

     Flynn told GA that everyone was sick of the litigation and
wanted to get on with their lives. Flynn said that he was sick of
the litigation, the threats to him and his family and wanted out. 
He said that as a part of the settlement he and all co-counsels had
agreed to not become involved in organization-related litigation in
the future. He expressed a deep concern that the courts in this
country cannot deal with Scn and its lawyers and their contemptuous
abuse of the justice system. He told GA that if he didn't sign the
documents all he had to look forward to was more years of
harassment and misery. Another client in the room with Flynn and GA
during this discussion yelled at GA, accusing him of killing the
settlement for everyone, and saying that everyone else had signed
or would sign, and everyone else wanted the settlement. Flynn said
that Scn would only settle with everyone together; otherwise there
would be no settlement. (SS 1C, 1D, 1E, CT 8420,1; CT 6913; 6127,8;
5902) Flynn said that he had to get out of the fight, that he had
done enough, that he had paid his dues, that Scientology had ruined
his marriage, his wife's health and his life. (CT 5902)

     Flynn told GA that a major reason for the settlement's global
form was to give Scn the opportunity to change its combative
attitude and behavior by removing the threat he and his clients
represented to it. Flynn said that Scn's willingness to pay
substantial sums of money, after its agents and attorneys had sworn
for years to pay his clients "not one thin dime" was evidence of a
philosophic shift within the organization. GA told Flynn that the
SA evidenced the unchanged philosophy of fair game, and that if Scn
did not use the opportunity to transform its antisocial nature and
actions toward its members, critics and society he would, a few
years hence, because of his knowledge of Scn fraud and fair game,
be again embroiled in its litigation and targeted for extralegal
attacks. (SS 98, CT 8487; CT 6913,4; 6128; 5902)

      GA had been positioned as a deal-breaker, with all the other
settling parties depending on his signing in order to have the fair
game cease. He reasoned that if he signed, his co-litigants, some
of whom he knew to be in financial trouble, would be happy, the
stress they felt would be reduced and they could get on with their
lives. Flynn and the other lawyers would be happy and the threat to
them and their families would be removed. Scn would have the
opportunity they said they desired to clean up their act and start
anew. GA would have the opportunity to get on with his life and the
financial wherewithal to do so. He was also not unhappy to at that
time not have to testify in all the litigation nor to respond to
the media's frequent questions. He knew that if Scn continued its
fair game practices toward him he would be left to defend himself;
so, armed with Flynn's advice that the SA conditions he found so
offensive were not worth the paper they were printed on, and the
knowledge that Scn's attorneys were also aware of that legal
opinion, GA put on a happy face and the following day went through
a videotaped signing, which he saw as a charade. (CT 6914,5;
6129,30; 5902)

C. From Settlement to First Response

     It was GA's understanding and intention at the time of the
settlement that he would honor the silence and confidentiality
conditions of the SA, and that Scn had agreed to do likewise. (CT
6916) GA delivered to Scn the evidence he had accumulated in his
case, released to Scn the documents held by the LASC, and agreed to
the sealing of the Court file. (CT 123,4; 5925; 5940) After the
settlement, GA got on with his life, did many usual or unusual
things including pursuing religious studies, left Scn alone, and
did not speak publicly about Scn or his experiences. (CT 6997-7000;
5902,3) 

     Scn, however, could not leave GA alone but continued to
disseminate falsehoods about him publicly, and file false
statements about him in legal proceedings. He perceived that he was
still fair game, yet for 3 years, although saddened by the attacks,
he did nothing in response. These fair game attacks after December,
1986, but prior to any acts by GA which Scn claims are breaches of
the SA, include at least: delivering DA Documents (black PR) on him
to various media representatives; publishing Scn's own false
descriptions of his experiences; disseminating to the media an
edited, misleading and defamatory version of the secret and illegal
videotape its agents made of him; disseminating his own documents
which had been sealed on Scn's insistence in Armstrong I; filing
affidavits about him in a civil lawsuit in England (Scientology v.
Miller & Penguin Books, High Court of Justice, London, England,
Case No. 1987 C 6140) which falsely charged, inter alia, that GA
violated court orders and was an admitted agent provocateur of the
US Government; threatening him with being sued if he even talked to
attorneys in the Miller case in which the false charges about him
were being made; threatening to expose a private writing if he did
not assist Scn's effort to prevent a civil litigant, Bent Corydon,
from obtaining access to the Armstrong I LASC case file;
threatening him with being sued if he testified about his
Scientology experiences even pursuant to a subpoena. (SS 105A-H, CT
8491-3; CT 6916-9; 5931-46; 5903,4; Excerpts DA document, CT 6007-
10; videocassette face, Missing; Affidavits of Kenneth Long, CT
6011-69 (first page missing); CT 6072-102; Affidavit of Sheila
Chaleff, CT 6060,1; GA 1977,8 wage and tax statement, CT 6028; GA
Affidavit, CT 6029; Nondisclosure and Release Bond, CT 6030; GA
Deposition Transcript, CT 6031-43; GA Affidavit, CT 6087-102; CT
5926-8; 5943,4; 6919; 5970; 5904; 6135,6; GA Declaration, CT
6219,30). In 1987 Scn also filed in one of its cases with the IRS
the affidavit it had required GA sign as part of the settlement, in
direct violation of the promise it made through Flynn to only use
the document if GA attacked it. (CT 6138,9; IRS Final Adverse
Ruling re Church of Spiritual Technology, 7/8/88, CT 6241-3; CT
5903)

     In October, 1989 GA was served with a deposition subpoena by
plaintiff in the case of Bent Corydon v. Scientology, LASC No.
C694401. (CT 5925; Subpoena, CT 5990-4). Shortly afterward he was
called by Scn attorney Lawrence Heller, with whom he had three
telephone conversations over the next month. In these conversations
Heller threatened that GA could be sued if he testified, even
though he had been subpoenaed, and that he should refuse to answer
the deposition questions put to him by Corydon's attorney. Heller
offered to have Scn pay for a lawyer to represent GA at the
deposition. Heller requested GA to execute a declaration to assist
Scn in preventing GA's deposition from going forward, and
threatened that GA would have hassles if the deposition did go
forward. Heller also stated to GA that he should honor the SA
because Scn had honored it. Heller said that Scn had signed a non-
disclosure agreement as well and had lived up to it. GA told Heller
that Scn had filed declarations about him, put out dead agent
documents on him, and used the illegal videotape. GA made notes of
the conversations with Heller and recorded his side of the final
conversation. (CT 5925-8; 5943,4; Phone notes, CT 6227-37;
Transcript, CT 6238,9; CT 5904; 6135-7; CT 6919; CT 6970; CT 5904;
SS 105H, 8493,4; SS 103, CT 8490)

     On November 1, 1990 Scn filed a motion in Corydon to delay or
prevent the taking of certain third party depositions, one of whom
was GA. (CT 5995-6006) The motion and supporting declaration were
signed by attorney Heller who stated that he was personally
involved in the settlements. (Heller Declaration, CT 6002) Heller
stated in the motion: 
          "One of the key ingredients to completing these
     settlements, *insisted upon by all parties involved,* was
     strict confidentiality respecting: (1) the Scientology
     parishioner or staff member's experiences with the Church
     of Scientology; (2) any knowledge possessed by the
     Scientology entities concerning those staff members or
     parishioners." (Underline in orig.) (SS 102, CT 8489,90;
     CT 5998)
     
     Heller stated in his declaration:
          "The non-disclosure obligations were a key part of
     the settlement agreements insisted upon by all parties
     involved." (SS 101, CT 8488,9; CT 6003)
          "The contractual non-disclosure provisions were the
     one issue which was not debated by any of the parties or
     attorneys involved." (CT 6003)

     As a result of Heller's telephoned threats, which deeply
troubled him, GA concluded that the SA and Scn's efforts to enforce
it were acting to obstruct justice, and if he allowed himself to be
intimidated by the threats he would be abetting that obstruction.
He concluded that he had a right, and even a duty, regardless of
whatever the SA said, to not obstruct justice. He concluded that he
could not avoid a confrontation with Scn, and only then responded
to defend himself and to correct what he perceived were the
injustices created by the SA and Scn's misuse and violations
thereof. (CT 5928; 5930; 5940; 5945; 6919; 6970; 5904) Scn was
given a period of years to cease fair game. GA and the other
settling litigants had honored the agreements, removed themselves
as threats and allowed Scn the opportunity to change its combative
attitude and behavior. GA concluded that disclosure of Scn's
attitude and behavior would relieve and ultimately eliminate fair
game. (CT 6141,2)

      When he researched his rights, responsibilities and how to
proceed in response to Scn's threats and fair game, GA learned that
through the intervening five years Scientology had been able to
maintain its appeal from the 1984 Armstrong I decision, Scientology
v. Armstrong, No. B025920, Second District, Division Three. GA
petitioned for permission to respond in the appeal. The Court
granted his petition, and also unsealed the SA, which he had filed
as a sealed exhibit to his petition. (SS 106, CT 8494,5; CT
6919,20; 5904; Petition, CT 6113-8) At the same time GA also
petitioned Division Four of the Second District for permission to
respond in another appeal, Corydon v. Scientology, No. B038975,
that Scn had taken from a 1988 LASC order granting Corydon's motion
to unseal the Armstrong I court file. (Petition, CT 6119-22) Scn
opposed GA's petition and he filed a declaration dated March 15,
1990, (CT 5925-6123) detailing many of the organization's post
settlement threats and attacks and stating his position regarding
the unenforceability of several conditions of the SA. (CT 6970,1)
The Division Four Court granted GA's petition, and he filed a
respondent's brief in both appeals, which were ultimately
consolidated.

     On July 29, 1991 the Court of Appeal affirmed the 1984
decision and judgment in Armstrong I (Scientology v. Armstrong, 232
Cal.App.3d 1060, 283 Cal. Rptr. 917.) The Court of Appeal stated:
     "These [Suppressive Person] "declares"  subjected
     Armstrong to the "Fair Game Doctrine" of the Church which
     permits a suppressive person to be "tricked, sued or lied
     to or destroyed...[or] deprived of property or injured by
     any means by any Scientologist." (Id. at 1067; 920) (SS
127, CT 8517,8)

     In September, 1991 Scn filed a motion in the Court of Appeal
to seal the record on appeal, (CT 6521-88) based in part on the
assertion that "an integral, indispensable part of that [Armstrong
I] settlement was the sealing of the court's records." (CT 6529) GA
filed an opposition to the motion to seal (CT 6589-902) in which he
stated that "[t]he superior rights regarding the materials
plaintiffs want sealed are those of defendant whose safety from
attack rests in part on the availability of information and the
openness of court files, and those of the public who have a
Constitutional right to precisely the kind of information these
materials contain." (CT 6592). The Court of Appeal denied Scn's
motion to seal the record. (CT 6903)

D. Fair Game After Armstrong's First Response

     From the time GA petitioned the Court of Appeal, Scn has
continued to fair game him without letup.  These attacks include,
but are not limited to: (SS 107A-L, CT 8495-503; CT 5913-4)

     + Disseminating to the media dead agent packs of black PR on
him which provide Scn's false version of his experiences and
include at least the following lies:
     - he testified falsely at trial in 1984 (Scn DA Docs re GA and
Judge Breckenridge, CT 7527; 7533; 7600; 7605)
     - he "has adopted a degraded life-style (CT 7528; 7600)
     - he was "apparently naked" in a newspaper photo (CT 7528)
     - he is connected to Cult Awareness Network, hereinafter
"CAN," described by Scn as "a referral agency for those who engage
in the illegal activity of kidnapping adults for the purpose of
forcibly persuading them to abandon their religious beliefs" (CT
7528)
     - his defense at his 1984 trial "was a sham and a fraud" (CT
7528,9; 7614)
     - the LAPD "authorized" [Scn's] videotapes of GA (CT 7529;
7615)
     - GA wanted to plant fabricated documents in Scientology files
and tell the IRS to conduct a raid (CT 7529-31; 7609; 7615,6)
     - he wanted to plunder Scientology for his own financial gain
(CT 7530)
     - he never intended to stick to the terms of the SA (CT 7532;
7617)
     - his motives in writing attorney Eric Lieberman regarding the
case of Malcolm Nothling v. Scn, in South Africa were money and
power (CT 7533; GA letter, 6/21/91, CT 7482-98)
     - he was incompetent as a researcher on the Hubbard biography
project (CT 7533; 7622)
     - he wanted to orchestrate a coup in which members of the US
Government would wrest control of Scn (CT 7531; 7616)

     + Using transcripts and other documents to attack him which
Scn itself has insisted be sealed (CT 7537-97; 7533; 7534; 7610;
7616; 7623)

     + Publishing black PR on him without stating its source which
provide Scn's false version of his experiences and include at least
these false and/or perverted charges:
     - he was formerly a heavy drug user (Scn publication
"FACTNet," CT 7514)
     - he was paid to provide homosexual sex (CT 7514)
     - a Marin Independent Journal photo showed him in the nude
holding the globe (CT 7514; Marin IJ article 11/11/92, CT 7184)
     - he is a psychotic and lives in a delusory world (Scn
publication "FACTNet," CT 7520)

     + Scn director Michael Rinder wrote a letter to the Mirror
Newspaper Group in London, United Kingdom in which he stated that
GA "has now distinguished himself by posing naked in a newspaper"
(Rinder letter, 5/9/94, CT 7524)

     + Scn President Heber Jentzsch wrote a letter, sent with
documents about GA, to E! Television in which he stated that GA
"has no relation to art or artists...except, of course, for the
photo of himself, nude, hugging the globe (Jentzsch letter 8/5/93,
CT 7693)

     + Scn agent Eugene Ingram spread the lie that GA has AIDS (CT
5916; 8226,7; Videotape taken by Ingram of GA at November, 1992 CAN
Convention, CT 8242; Notice of Lodging Videotape, CT 8676,7))

     + Scn agent Garry Scarff was briefed by Ingram to expand on
the [invented] "fuck buddy" relationship between GA and attorney
Ford Greene (Scarff declaration, 2/11/93, CT 7510)

     + Filing declarations and other documents in various courts
containing false charges, and then using the SA to prevent GA from
responding or to punish him for responding (Declaration of David
Miscavige, 2/8/94, filed in Scientology v. Fishman, USDC Cen. Dist.
Cal. No. 91-6426 HLH, CT 7655,6; CT 5580-93; 5624-39; Scn's Second
Amended Complaint herein, CT 5356,7; Scn's motion for summary
adjudication of 13th, 16th, 17th & 19th causes of action, 3/17/95,
CT 5312,3; Scn's separate statement in support of motion for
summary adjudication, 2/23/95, CT 4524.44 CT 9789) (Scn's Supp.
Memo. in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 8/26/91, filed in Aznaran v.
Scientology, USDC Cen. Dist. Cal. No. 88-1786 JMI, CT 6682-6;
Declaration of Sam Brown, 8/26/91, CT 6714,5; Declaration of Lynn
Farny, 8/26/91, CT 6725-7; Reply in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, 8/26/91, filed in Aznaran, CT 6797-9; GA Declaration,
9/3/91, CT 6802-12; CT 4524.36; CT; CT 9787)

     + Attempting to have Armstrong jailed for contempt of court
based on mischaracterization of his actions and manufactured
actions (Scn's Ex Parte Application herein for OSC re Contempt,
12/31/92, CT 7121-84; GA Declaration, CT 7406,7; Scn's evidence, GA
declaration, 2/2/93, CT 5016-44; Scn's Ex Parte Application for OSC
re Contempt, 7/26/93, CT 1628-739; Order of Judge Diane Wayne
herein discharging OSC, 7/29/94, CT 7499-501)
     
     + Providing documentation to Premiere magazine about GA,
including partial transcripts of the illegal Ingram videotaping of
him and then using the settlement agreement to punish GA for
responding (Article "Catch a Rising Star, 9/93, CT 7672; GA letter,
10/11/93, CT 4811-4; CT 4524.48; Scn's motion for summary
adjudication of 20th cause of action, CT 4524.11; CT 9790)

     + Providing a press release to the Marin Independent Journal
concerning the Court's 1/27/95 ruling, which discusses GA's Scn
experiences and contains the false statement that he "promised [in
the SA] to refrain from spreading falsehoods about [Scn];" and then
using the settlement agreement to punish GA for responding; (Scn
press release from Nancy O'Meara and Andrew H. Wilson, 1/95, CT
7692; GA letter to O'Meara, CT 5056; CT 4524.17,8

     + Secretly videotaping him (GA letters, 8/21/91, 8/22/91, CT
6834-9; CT 6714)

E. Armstrong's Actions

     In August, 1990, GA was in a new home he had purchased in
Marin County, and living his life. (CT 6998-7000) Although still a
troubled target of fair game, he considered himself free of the
SA's restrictions, not only because of what Flynn had told him at
the time of the settlement, but because of Scn's post settlement
attacks and the SA's unenforceability due to its obstruction of
justice. (CT 6972; 5928; 5930; 5940; 5945) Then the Iraqi army
invaded Kuwait, and his life was again forever changed. Moved by
media reports of the invasion, the global tension, and the daily
events of Desert Shield, GA prayed for guidance concerning
humanity's condition, and specifically the then developing Middle
East crisis. (CT 6988; 5905,6) GA received a message, which he
believed came from God, saying: "Keep nothing. Give what you have
to the poor. Take only what you need." (Message, CT 7204) The idea
of renunciation of worldly wealth, although coming at that time as
a surprise, and unclear as to the details for its accomplishment,
was not altogether illogical to GA because he had long recognized
that money, greed and power motivated much of the madness that made
human beings war against each other. (CT 6988) He had already
recognized the essential valuelessness of money in an essay he had
written in 1989. (CT 7039-41) GA also recognized that Scn's leaders
were motivated by the same forces of money, greed and power that
made men war against each other and that his renunciation was
spiritually directed at bringing peace for Scn no less than the
rest of the world. (CT 7002) GA gave away his assets, including his
ownership of The Gerald Armstrong Corporation, hereinafter "TGAC,"
his philosophic services company; his ownership of his home;
forgave debts owed him; and determined to go wherever his help was
asked for. (CT 7002; 5906) Over the next few months GA gave himself
to resolving the Middle East crisis (CT 7095-103) but he was not
successful and a quarter million people were killed. 

     In June, 1991 GA received a call from Malcolm Nothing, asking
him to testify in his case against Scn in South Africa. Nothling
said he had not been able to find anyone else in the world willing
to testify about Scn's policies and practices. After listening to
Nothling's story, and because Nothling had asked, GA agreed to help
him. GA said he first wanted to see if the situation could be
resolved peacefully, and he wrote a letter to attorney Lieberman,
who represented Scn in the Armstrong I appeal. (CT 7482-98) Scn
rejected GA's peace proposal, so he flew to South Africa and helped
Nothling, but did not testify as the trial was postponed. (CT 7004;
5906) (SS 21-2, CT 8438,9)

     Before leaving for South Africa, GA received a call from
attorney Joseph Yanny, asking for GA's help in the Aznaran case.
Yanny told GA that he had come into the case after the Aznarans had
been tricked by Scn into firing their attorney Ford Greene. GA
travelled to Los Angeles and wrote a declaration concerning the
unjust effect of the 1986 "global settlement" on litigants against
Scn and in the legal community, and helped Yanny with moral support
and matters of the soul. (CT 7005; 5906)

     As GA was leaving for South Africa he learned from Yanny that
Scn had sued Yanny for allegedly inducing GA to breach the SA. In
response, GA wrote a declaration in which he stated his philosophy
regarding his calling to help. (GA Declaration, 7/19/91, CT 6740-9)
     "But more than a desire to protect myself or right the
     organization's unjust acts towards me, however, I helped
     Mr. Yanny for the simple reason that he asked.  I will do
     the same for anyone....It is not only the right of all
     men to respond to requests for help, it is our essence. 
     If I was induced, therefore, to help Mr. Yanny, or anyone
     else, it was our Creator Who induced me." (CT 6747)

     In its lawsuit, Scientology v, Yanny, LASC No. BC 033035, Scn
claimed that Yanny, who had formerly represented Scn, was
representing GA in Scn-related litigation. Yanny had never
represented GA in any litigation and GA had never consulted Yanny
about his Scn legal battle.  Scn's complaint was ultimately
dismissed. (CT 7005,6) Scn considers GA's declaration, provided by
him in a case in which an attorney was falsely sued for
representing him, a SA violation. (CT 4524.8; 4524.37,8; 9787,8)
(SS 17-20, CT 8436-8)

     Upon his return to the US GA received the complaint Scn filed
against 17 IRS agents, Scientology v. Xanthos, et al., USDC Cen.
Dist. Cal. No. 91-4301-SVW, which contained the allegation that: 
     "The infiltration of the Church was planned as an
     undercover operation by the LA CID (Criminal
     Investigation Division of the IRS) along with former
     Church member Gerald Armstrong, who planned to seed
     church files with forged documents which the IRS could
     seize in a raid. The CID actually planned to assist
     Armstrong in taking over the Church of Scientology
     hierarchy which would then turn over all Church documents
     to the IRS for their investigation." (Xanthos, complaint,
     8/12/91, CT 6636) 
Although GA had seen this attack line in many forms and venues
since 1985, this 1991 charge signaled to him that the organization
was not about to peacefully end its legal and psychological war in
which he knew he was one of its most hated enemies. (CT 7007,8)

     Within a few days GA went by Ford Greene's office, which was
near his residence in San Anselmo in Marin County. Greene, who was
one of few attorneys willing to take cases on behalf of Scn's
victims, had been reinstated as counsel in Aznaran. GA saw that
Greene was facing several summary judgment and other motions Scn
had filed in the case when the Aznarans were lawyerless, had no
time, staff or other resources, and truly needed GA's help. (CT
7006,7; 6811,2) GA worked for Greene as his sole office assistant
from August, 1991 until, except for a three week period, December,
1995. (CT 5907) Throughout those years Scn tried continuously to
prevent GA from working with Greene. (See, e.g., CT 6804-12; 7508;
7510,1; 7131-3; Complaint herein, CT 0009-10; Bartilson
Declaration, 12/31/92, CT 7143-6)(SS 12-16, CT 8432-6)

F. Scientology's Enforcement Litigation  

     In October, 1991 Scn filed a motion in Armstrong I to enforce
the SA. GA opposed the motion and on December 23, 1991, after a
hearing, LASC Judge Bruce R. Geernaert denied it. Judge Geernaert
stated regarding the SA: 
          "So my belief is Judge Breckenridge, being a very
     careful judge....if he had been presented that whole
     agreement and if he had been asked to order its
     performance, he would have dug his feet in because that
     is one .... I'll say one of the most ambiguous, one-sided
     agreements I have ever read.  And I would not have
     ordered the enforcement of hardly any of the terms if I
     had been asked to, even on the threat that, okay the case
     is not settled. 
          I know we like to settle cases.  But we don't like
     to settle cases and, in effect, prostrate the court
     system into making an order which is not fair or in the
     public interest." (SS 120, CT 8510,1; Transcript of
     12/23/91 hearing, CT 7700)

     On February 4, 1992, Scn filed its verified complaint for
damages and for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for
breach of contract, Marin SC No. 152229, hereinafter "Armstrong
II." (CT 0001-12)On February 7, 1992 Scn filed a motion for
preliminary injunction. (CT 0073-4). GA filed a motion to transfer
the case to the LASC, which was granted March 20, 1992. (CT 75-80.
The case was transferred and given LASC No. BC 052395. (CT 0081)

     On April 14, 1992 Scn filed a renewed motion for preliminary
injunction (CT 0082-4), a hearing on which was held May 26 and 27
before LASC Judge Ronald Sohigian, who on May 28, issued an order
granting in part Scn's motion.  He prohibited GA from:
          "Voluntarily assisting any person (not a
     governmental organ or entity) intending to make,
     intending to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending
     to litigate a claim against the persons referred to in
     sec. 1 of the [SA] regarding such claim or regarding
     pressing, arbitrating, or litigating it.
          Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental
     organ or entity) arbitrating, or litigating a claim
     against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the [SA].
          "The Court does not intend by the foregoing to
     prohibit [GA] from (a) being reasonably available for the
     service of subpoenas on him; (b) accepting service of
     subpoenas on him without physical resistance, obstructive
     tactics, or flight; (c) testifying fully and fairly in
     response to questions in either deposition, at trial, or
     in other legal proceedings; (d) properly reporting or
     disclosing to authorities criminal conduct of the persons
     referred to in sec. 1 of the [SA]; or (e) engaging in
     gainful employment rendering clerical or paralegal
     services not contrary to the terms and conditions of this
     order.
          The application for preliminary injunction is otherwise
denied." (Order 5/28/92, CT 0091-4)

     GA appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction.

     On June 4, 1992 Scn filed an amended verified complaint for
damages and for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for
breach of contract. (CT 0095-115) On June 23, 1992 Scn filed an 
amendment to complaint, adding TGAC as Doe 1. (CT 0159) On July 22,
1992 GA filed his answer and a cross-complaint for declaratory
relief, abuse of process, and breach of contract, (CT 0160-254). 
On October 8, 1992 he filed an amended answer and an amended cross-
complaint. (CT 0255-333) 

     On December 31, 1992 Scn filed an application for an OSC why
GA should not be held in contempt. (CT 0428-639) The OSC was signed
by Judge Sohigian. (CT 640,1) The charged contempts were for a
letter GA wrote to Scn leader David Miscavige (CT 0436,7; GA
letter, 12/22/92, CT 0525-34) a discussion with the Aznarans;
signing 2 proofs of service in their case (CT 0438,9; Proofs of
service, CT 0567-70); "assisting" Greene clients Tillie Good,
Denise Cantin and Ed Roberts (CT 0439-40); and making a videotape
discussing his Scn experiences. (CT 0440-2) GA filed his opposition
to the OSC, and various supporting declarations and other
documents. Scn filed a motion in limine to exclude Scn's prior
acts, and various other documents relating to the OSC. (CT 0644-
1268) On March 5, 1993 a hearing was held before LASC Judge Diane
Wayne, who ruled that because the 5/28/92 order was on appeal, she
would not proceed. Judge Wayne stated during the hearing:
     "I have some serious questions about the validity of the
     order." (Transcript, CT 1410)
     "I'll tell you, when I first looked at this order, I
     thought the order was clear until I read part of the
     transcript.  Then it became unclear to me." (CT 1414)

     On March 17, 1993 GA filed an application to stay proceedings
(CT 1269-86) based on his appeal of the 5/28/92 order, which Scn
opposed. (CT 1297-394) On March 23, 1993 LASC Judge David A.
Horowitz granted the motion. (Order, CT 1596)

     On July 26, 1993 Scn filed a second application for an OSC re
contempt. (CT 1628-739) The charged contempt was for providing a
declaration of Lawrence Wollersheim in the case of Scientology v.
Wollersheim, LASC No. BC 074815. (CT 1629; 1634,5; GA declaration,
6/4/93, CT 1686-90) On July 26, 1993 GA filed his opposition to the
application. (CT 1740-98) The OSC was signed by Judge Wayne. (CT
1601,2) On September 7, 1993 GA filed an opposition to the OSC (CT
1800-98) and on September 10, Scn filed its response. (CT 1905-
1932)

     On July 8, 1993 Scn filed a verified complaint for damages and
for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for breach of
contract, LASC No. BC 084462, hereinafter "Armstrong III." All the
documents filed in this case are missing. On August 27, 1993 the
LASC ruled that Armstrong II and Armstrong III were related cases.
(CT 1799) On September 14, 1993, GA filed a special motion to
strike the Armstrong III complaint pursuant to the SLAPP Statute.
On September 29 Scn filed an opposition, and on October 4, GA filed
a reply. On October 6 Judge Horowitz entered an order consolidating
Armstrong III with II and staying the action. On February 10, 1994
Scn filed a motion to vacate the stay, GA filed an opposition, and
on March 14 Judge Horowitz entered an order denying the motion.

     On July 23, 1993 Scn filed a verified complaint to set aside
fraudulent transfers and for damages; conspiracy, Marin SC No.
157680, hereinafter "Armstrong IV," against GA, TGAC and Michael
Walton. (CT 3071-86) Walton was GA's friend and part owner of the
Marin house to whom GA had transferred his ownership in August,
1990 at the time of his epiphanic renunciation. Scn charged that GA
had given Walton the house to make himself judgment proof in order
to prevent Scn from collecting on liquidated damages for GA's
planned breaches of the SA. That case, now part of the consolidated
case with the same number, Marin SC No. 157680, was not disposed of
by summary judgment, and remains to be tried. Walton filed an
answer in Armstrong IV on November, 29, 1993 (CT 3102-7), and GA
and TGAC filed answers on November 30. (CT 3108-3155)

     On April 5, 1994 Scn filed in Armstrong II its verified second
amended complaint. (CT 1933-2037)

     On May 16, 1994 the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division
Four issued its opinion affirming the 5/28/92 preliminary
injunction order. (CT 2040-50) The Court stated:
     "We find no abuse of discretion.  We cannot say that the
     trial court erred as a matter of law in weighing the
     hardships or in determining there is a reasonable
     probability Church would ultimately prevail to the
     limited extent reflected by the terms of the preliminary
     injunction." (CT 2048)
          "This appeal is only from the granting of a
     preliminary injunction which expressly did not decide the
     ultimate merits. As limited by the trial court here, the
     preliminary injunction merely restrains, for the time
     being, Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other
     litigation against Church, in violation of his own
     agreement." (CT 2049)

          On June 15, 1994 Scn filed a motion for summary
adjudication of the second and third causes of action of the cross-
complaint. (CT 2080-249) The second cause of action is abuse of
process; the third is breach of contract. On July 20 GA filed his
opposition, (CT 2251-533) and on July 26 Scn filed its reply. (CT
2589-689) On August 16 Judge Horowitz granted Scn's motion for
summary adjudication, ruling as to breach of contract that the SA
did not prohibit Scn from referring to GA in the media, legal
proceedings or declarations. (CT 3019-21)

     A hearing was held on Scn's orders to show cause re contempt
before Judge Diane Wayne on July 28, 1994.  On July 29 she issued
an order discharging the OSC and GA, ruling that GA's "assistance"
in Ford Greene's office was permitted "ministerial" conduct, that
providing Wollersheim with a declaration was permissible as
Wollersheim was a defendant in the relevant litigation, and that
GA's 12/22/92 letter did not assist in litigation. (CT 2690-2)

     On September 1, 1994, pursuant to stipulation, Armstrong II
was transferred to Marin County.  (CT 3023-5) Pursuant to a joint
application for consolidation filed September 12, 1994 (CT 3156-69)
Marin SC Judge Gary W. Thomas consolidated Armstrong II, III and IV
into one case, Marin SC No. 157680. Scn filed an amendment
substituting Solina Behbehani-Walton, Michael Walton's wife, as Doe
2. (CT 3170,1) On January 5, 1995 Mrs. Walton filed her answer. 
(CT 3667-71)

     On November 16, 1994 Scn filed its motion for summary
adjudication of the fourth, sixth and eleventh causes of action of
plaintiff's second amended complaint. (CT 3172-3665) On January 13
GA filed his opposition. (CT 3875-4076; 4097-4224) The fourth cause
of action concerns GA's providing the Aznarans with a declaration
(CT 3184,5); the sixth concerns GA's giving an interview to CNN TV
and American Lawyer magazine; and the eleventh concerns GA's
providing a declaration to defendants in Scientology v Scott, USDC
No. CV 85-711 JMI and 85-7197 JMI (CT 3185,6). On January 19 GA
filed a supplemental declaration, along with evidence (CT 7400-
504), providing his conviction that what Scn was seeking to prevent
him from saying was religious expression which was above legal
prohibition. (CT 7400-7) Judge Thomas struck the declaration as it
was filed late. On January 20 Scn filed its reply. (CT 4077-96) A
hearing was held January 27. (Reporter's Transcript on Appeal,
hereinafter "RT," V. 1, 1-15)

     Judge Thomas granted Scn's summary adjudication motion as to
the fourth and sixth causes of action and denied it as to the
eleventh. In his order he stated in part:
          "As to all causes of action, defendant fails to
     raise a triable issue as to whether the liquidated
     damages provision is invalid. [] The law now presumes
     that liquidated damages provisions are "valid unless the
     party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes
     that the provision was unreasonable under the
     circumstances existing at the time the contract was
     made." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1671, Subd (b).) Defendant's
     evidence is not sufficient to raise a triable issue in
     that regard. Although defendant states in his declaration
     that he was not involved in negotiating the provision []
     he goes on to say that he discussed the provision with
     two attorneys before signing the agreement. [] Thus he
     clearly knew of the provision yet chose to sign it. He
     has not shown that he had unequal bargaining power or
     that he made any efforts to bargain or negotiate with
     respect to the provision. [] Defendant next states that
     plaintiff's actual damages are zero []. However, "The
     amount of damages actually suffered has no bearing on the
     validity of the liquidated provision.." [] Finally
     defendant points to the fact that other settlement
     agreements contain a $10,000 liquidated damages
     provision. [] This alone is not sufficient to raise a
     triable issue that defendant has not shown that
     circumstances did not change between 12/86 and 4/87 and
     that those settling parties stand in the same or similar
     position to defendant (i.e., that they were as high up in
     the organization and could cause as much damage by
     speaking out against plaintiff or that they have/had
     access to as much information as defendant).
          "Defendant also has not raised a triable issue
     regarding duress. Defendant's own declaration shows that
     he did not execute the agreement under duress in that it
     shows he carefully weighed his options. It certainly does
     not show that he did something against his will or that
     he had "no reasonable alternative to succumbing." [cite]
     In addition, defendant is relying on the conduct of a
     third party (Flynn) to establish duress, yet he sets
     forth no fact or evidence in his separate statement
     showing that plaintiff had reason to know of the duress. 
          "Defendant fails to raise a triable issue regarding
     obstruction of justice/suppression of evidence. The
     settlement agreement expressly does not prohibit
     defendant from disclosing information pursuant to
     subpoena or other legal process. [cite] Nor is plaintiff
     in this cause of action seeking to prohibit disclosure to
     government agencies conducting investigations pursuant to
     statutory obligations. [cite]. Even if a portion of the
     agreement could be construed to so prohibit (see e.g.,
     para. 10), plaintiff is not relying on that section. Nor
     has defendant shown that the provision is so substantial
     as to render the entire contract illegal. [cite]" (Order,
     CT 4236-9)

     On February 23 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the twentieth cause of action. (CT 4244-5234) In its twentieth
cause of action Scn sought a permanent injunction prohibiting GA
from violating any provisions of the SA. (CT 1963; Memorandum in
support of motion for summary adjudication, CT 4524.21,2)

      On March 17 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the thirteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth causes of
action. (CT 5298-661) The thirteenth cause of action concerned a
videotape interview GA gave at a CAN conference in 1992 (CT
1951,2); the sixteenth concerned GA's being interviewed by Newsweek
magazine (1953,4); the seventeenth concerned GA's being interviewed
by Entertainment Television; the nineteenth concerned GA's
providing a declaration dated 2/22/94 to be filed in the Scn v.
Fishman case. (CT 1957,8)

     On April 19 GA filed a notice Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (USBC, Nor.
Dist. Cal. No. 95-10911) and imposition of automatic stay. (CT
5850-2) On April 21 Judge Thomas stayed the state action. (CT 5853)

     Scn brought an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court
(Scientology v. Armstrong, USBC, Nor. Dist. Cal. No. 95-1164) which
resulted in the stay being lifted. (CT 5855) On September 18 GA
filed his opposition to Scn's motion for summary adjudication of
the twentieth cause of action, and his opposition to the motion for
summary adjudication of the thirteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and
nineteenth causes of action. (CT 5871-8553)

     On September 20, Scn filed an ex parte application for an
order sealing certain exhibits in GA's evidence, claiming that they
were trade secrets. (CT 8579-8598) GA filed an opposition (CT 8554-
77; 8599-617) Judge Thomas sealed certain of those exhibits pending
the hearing on Scn's motions. (CT 8618,9) On September 25 Scn filed
a reply in support of its summary adjudication motions. (CT 8620-
45) A hearing was held October 6. (RT V. 2, 2-17)

     Judge Thomas issued an order granting Scn's motions for
summary adjudication. (CT 8679,80) He stated:
          "Invalidity of Liquidated Damages Provision:
     Defendant's evidence regarding his attorney's failure to
     represent his interests (see facts 43 and 68) is hearsay
     and/or not based on personal knowledge. The opinion of
     defendant's attorney as to the validity of the provision
     (see, e.g., facts 52-54, 57-60) is irrelevant and
     hearsay. The fact that two other clients signed a
     settlement agreement containing the same liquidated
     damages amount (see facts 55-56 and 63-64) does not raise
     an inference that the provision was unreasonable.
     Defendant's evidence is insufficient to raise a
     reasonable inference of unequal bargaining power (No
     personal knowledge shown that plaintiff, as opposed to
     Flynn, positioned defendant as a "deal breaker"; Flynn's
     statements hearsay; no personal knowledge shown of
     plaintiff's wealth; wealth alone does not raise inference
     of unequal bargaining power since no showing defendant
     desperate for money and had to accept on plaintiff's
     terms). Defendant's evidence does not raise an inference
     that plaintiff's calculation is "unfathomable"
     (fourteenth cause of action seeks $50,000 for each of 18
     letters; nineteenth cause of action is based only on
     declarations, not on other contacts between defendant and
     attorney/other clients). Defendant fails to establish how
     he knows plaintiff had not been injured by his statements
     at the time of the settlement.
          Duress: Flynn's statements to defendant are hearsay.
     (See, e.g., D's facts 1C and 1D) Further defendant has
     now shown that plaintiff was aware of Flynn's purported
     duress of defendant. [cite] Contrary to defendant's
     statement about duress, "careful weighing of options" is
     completely inconsistent with an absence "of free exercise
     of his will power" or his having "no reasonable
     alternative to succumbing." [cites]
          Fraud: Flynn's statements to defendant (See fact 78)
     are hearsay. The Court finds that the portions of the
     agreement cited by defendant (see facts 79 and 80) do not
     establish a mutual confidentiality requirement. Paragraph
     7(I) only prohibits the parties from disclosing
     information *in litigation between the parties;*
     paragraph 18(D) only prohibits disclosure of the terms of
     the settlement; defendant has not shown that plaintiff
     did either of those things. Further, "something more than
     nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's
     intention not to perform his promise." [cite]
          No Specific Performance,Breach of Express and
     Implied Covenant: Defendant relies on the purported
     mutuality requirement, which he has failed to establish.
          Obstruction of Justice: This argument was rejected
     by the Court in connection with plaintiff's first summary
     adjudication.  (See 2/22/95 Order at para.6.)
          First Amendment: First Amendment rights may be
     waived by contract. [cite]
On October 17, 1995 Judge Thomas signed Scn's order of permanent
injunction. (CT 8685-93)

     On October 26 Scn filed a motion for summary adjudication of
the first cause of action for declaratory relief in GA's cross-
complaint; severance of the fraudulent conveyance claim; dismissal
of unadjudicated breach of contract claims; and entry of final
judgment. (CT 8694-927) On November 17 GA filed his opposition (CT
9218-362), and on November 27 Scn filed its reply. (CT 9453-65)

     On November 2 GA filed a motion for reconsideration of the
grant of summary adjudication as to twentieth cause of action for
permanent injunction, (CT 8928-9045) and on November 16 an amended
motion for reconsideration. (CT 9046-217) GA filed under seal his
evidence previously stricken in Judge Thomas's 10/5/95 order. (CT
9218-20) On November 22 Scn filed its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration. (CT 9364-452) On November 29 GA filed his reply.
(CT 9466-519) A hearing was held December 1. (RT V. 2, 18-27)

     Judge Thomas issued an order denying GA's motion for
reconsideration, and granting in part Scn's motion for summary
adjudication. (CT 9521,2)

     On January 24, Judge Thomas signed an order granting Scn's
motion to sever the fraudulent conveyance action, dismiss the
remaining breach of contract causes of action, enter final
judgment, and adjudicate Scn the prevailing party. (CT 9652-6)

     On January 24, 1996 Scn filed a renewal motion for summary
judgment of GA's cross-complaint. (CT 9526-642) On February 23 GA
filed his opposition (CT 9677-772) and on February 26 an amended
opposition. (CT 9749-9778.1) On March 1 Scn filed its reply. (CT
9773-8.1) A hearing was held March 8. (RT V. 1, 26-38) Judge Thomas
issued an order granting Scn's motion for summary judgment on GA's
cross-complaint.(CT 9780)

     On May 2, 1996 the Court entered its Judgment. (CT 9783-94)

     On July 8, 1996 GA filed his notice of appeal.    

III. ARGUMENT

A. There is a Triable Issue as to Duress

     In his January 27, 1995 order on Scn's first summary
adjudication motion of certain causes of action of its complaint,
Judge Thomas stated, regarding GA's defense of having signed Scn's
SA because of duress, that GA's own declaration shows that he did
not execute the agreement under duress in that it shows he
carefully weighed his options. Judge Thomas also stated that GA
relied on the conduct of attorney Flynn, a third party, to
establish duress, yet provided no evidence showing that plaintiff
had reason to know of the duress. (CT 4236-9)

     In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
of its complaint GA provided evidence of Flynn's being fair game
and a target of many Scn attacks from 1979 until the settlement.
(SS 1B, CT 8418-20) In that Scn was the source of the attacks which
included some 15 lawsuits, bar complaints and framing with a check
forgery, it is obvious that Scn knew of at least that aspect of the
duress on Flynn. Scn also knew of all its own acts of fair game
directed at GA up to that time, and at all the other settling
parties. It goes without saying that the purpose of fair game in
its many forms is to apply duress in its many forms to its
designated targets. GA filed as part of his evidence declarations
by several individuals who had knowledge of fair game. (Hana
Whitfield, CT 7780-7887; see, e.g., 7788-91, 7808-27; Dennis
Erlich, CT 7888-99 at 7891; Margery Wakefield, CT 7900-41 at 7903;
Keith Scott, CT 7942-52 at 7945; Malcolm Nothling, CT 7953-9 at
7955, 7958; Jonathon Atack, CT 7960-8038, at 7962-4, 7977-80; Nancy
McLean, CT 8939-49 at 40,1; Lawrence Wollersheim, CT 8052-216 at
8053-59, 8074-212)

     That Flynn, GA and the other settling individuals were targets
of fair game is also shown in the "settlement agreement" between
Flynn and his clients, wherein is stated:
          "We the undersigned, agree and acknowledge that many
     of the cases/clients involved in this settlement...have
     been subjected to intense, and prolonged harassment by
     the Church of Scientology throughout the litigation...
     that [Flynn] or his firm's members have been required to
     defend  approximately 17 lawsuits and/or civil/criminal
     contempt actions instituted by the Church of Scientology
     against him, his associates and clients, that he and his
     family have been subjected to intense and prolonged
     harassment..." (CT 5486,7)

     The idea that duress applied by a third party to a person to
get him to sign a document cannot be ascribed to the party seeking
the person's signature is not supported by common sense. If an
agent of a corporation holds a gun to the head of an attorney's
wife, and the attorney tells his client he must sign the
corporation's document or the attorney's wife will be killed,
although the corporate agent doesn't know what the attorney says to
the client, the agent and his corporation are still the source of
and responsible for the duress on the attorney's client. In this
case, the threat of Scn continuing fair game to Flynn, his wife,
family, law firm and clients was the gun held to all their heads.
That Scn was holding its fair game gun to everyone's head was the
communication Flynn relayed to GA to get him to sign Scn's
document.

     The nature of the SA itself is also an inference of duress
since what attorney, but one under tremendous duress, would have
his client sign such a document, knowing intimately the history of
fair game by the organization who concocted it. It is clear that
Flynn had, before presenting Scn's SA to GA, already agreed to sign
a contract to not represent or defend GA if GA was attacked in the
future. Such a contract is illegal. What attorney, one as competent
as Flynn, would allow his client to be so exposed and defenseless
to future attacks, except an attorney under duress, or one
thoroughly corrupted. There is too much evidence of duress to
believe that Flynn was just corrupt.

     The duress at the time of the settlement, contrary to how it
might be viewed at first glance, is actually demonstrated by Scn's
continuing to fair game GA afterward. Tricking and lying to a
designated target are parts of the basic fair game doctrine. CT
6934; SS 1A, CT 8412) Scn tricked GA into signing its document by
lying about ceasing its attacks. This was acceptable Scn tactics
because GA is designated an SP and hence fair game.

     Duress is also evidenced by Flynn's communications to GA
throughout this litigation. Flynn has continually told him that he
would like to help GA but that he is afraid to. Flynn signed a SA
with Scn as well, and has refused to come forward throughout this
litigation, despite telling GA that he "would be there for [him]"
if he had any trouble with Scn after the settlement. (GA
Declaration, 7/20/94 CT 2298) GA filed a declaration executed April
7, 1995 stating what Flynn would testify to if he were released by
Scn from its contract with him. (CT 7678-83) Contracts which limit
an attorney's ability to practice or limit his clients are illegal.

     In his order of October 6, Judge Thomas stated again that GA
had not shown that Scn "was aware of Flynn's purported duress of
defendant." (CT 8679) That is not the issue; the issue is Scn's
duress of Flynn, GA and everyone else involved. What Flynn stated
to GA may be hearsay, but what Scn did over its years of attacks on
Flynn and GA, and what it would continue to do if GA didn't sign is
the source of the duress.

     Judge Thomas stated that "careful weighing of options" is
completely inconsistent with an absence "of free exercise of [GA's]
will power" or his having "no reasonable alternative to
succumbing." That cannot be true. A person with a gun at his head
may weigh his options just as carefully as a person with free
exercise of his will. His options are, however, radically
different. In this case, GA's options were either sign Scn's
document or have Scn continue to threaten and attack his attorneys,
their families, the 20 other people who wanted out from the threats
and attacks, and himself. Also included in GA's weighing of his
options was Scn's promise through Flynn that it would cease all its
fair game activities against everyone. Flynn's statements to GA
that the SA's prohibitions were not worth the paper they were
printed on and unenforceable, although perhaps ultimately true, are
also reflective of duress, and were also part of GA's weighing of
his options. Some people carefully weigh things; some people don't.
It is the nature of the options being weighed, carefully or not,
which is the true indicator of duress. Judge Thomas did not examine
GA's options. These are options which must be examined by the trier
of fact.

B. There is a Triable Issue as to Fraud

     GA has stated throughout this case that he intended to honor
the silence and confidentiality conditions of the SA agreement and
that he understood Scn was to do likewise. (CT 6916) Indeed Scn's
being silent about him, and therefore ceasing to lie about him, was
inherent in Scn's promise to cease all fair game activities, as
relayed by Flynn. Scn has maintained throughout this case that it
may say whatever it wants about GA publicly, and file whatever it
wants in legal proceedings, and is not bound by any agreement to
refrain from such acts. GA only began to speak out about Scn and
his experiences after Scn published and filed false statements
about him and he perceived that Scn was using his silence to
obstruct justice.

     In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
GA presented considerable evidence of Scn's promise of mutuality as
an inducement to have him settle his cross-complaint. This included
certain parts of the SA, notes of telephone calls from Scn attorney
Lawrence Heller, and a motion and supporting declaration authored
by Heller stating that confidentiality was mutual. (CT 5925-8;
5943,4; Phone notes, CT 6227-37; Transcript, CT 6238,9; CT 5904;
6135-7; CT 6919; CT 6970; CT 5904; SS 105H, 8493,4; SS 103, CT
8490)

     In his order granting summary adjudication, Judge Thomas only
commented on two of the SA parts, but did not mention Heller's
telephone statements to GA or Heller's sworn statements. (CT 8680)
Judge Thomas stated that paragraph 18(D) only prohibits disclosure
of the terms of the settlement. But Paragraph 18(E), which he did
not take note of, states: "The parties further agree to forbear and
refrain from doing any act or exercising any right, whether
existing now or in the future, which act or exercise is
inconsistent with this Agreement." (SS 99, CT 8487,8) GA still
believes that this means that Scn must forbear and refrain from
publishing and filing anything about him, other than "stating that
this civil action (Armstrong I) is settled in its entirety." (SA,
18(D), SS 99, CT 8487,8) If GA had understood that Scn's forbearing
and refraining from acts inconsistent with the SA meant that Scn
would publish or file whatever it wanted about him in the future,
he would have, as he has said consistently throughout this case,
never signed. It is clear that the SA was cleverly worded by clever
lawyers, who were more clever than GA.

     Judge Thomas also stated that "something more than
nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's intention not
to perform his promise." But GA presented a great deal more to
prove Scn's representation of its intention, and to prove that
there is a triable issue regarding both parties' intention. 

     In the fall of 1989 attorney Heller threatened GA with
"hassles" if his deposition in the Corydon litigation went forward,
and threatened him with being sued if he testified about his
knowledge even though pursuant to a subpoena. In this conversation
Heller told GA he should honor the SA because Scn had honored it,
and that Scn had signed a non-disclosure agreement as well and had
lived up to it. GA told Heller that Scn had filed declarations
about him, put out dead agent documents on him, and used an illegal
videotape of him. GA's notes of the Heller calls and his recording
of his side of the final conversation support his declaration
containing Heller's comments. (CT 5925-8; 5943,4; Phone notes, CT
6227-37; Transcript, CT 6238,9; CT 5904; 6135-7; CT 6919; CT 6970;
CT 5904; SS 105H, 8493,4; SS 103, CT 8490)

     In a motion he filed in Corydon to prevent GA's deposition,
Heller stated:
          "One of the key ingredients to completing these
     settlements, *insisted upon by all parties involved*, was
     strict confidentiality respecting: (1) the Scientology
     parishioner or staff member's experiences with the Church
     of Scientology; (2) any knowledge possessed by the
     Scientology entities concerning those staff members or
     parishioners." (Underline in orig.) (SS 102, CT 8489,90;
     CT 5998)
     
     In his declaration Heller stated:
          "The non-disclosure obligations were a key part of
     the settlement agreements insisted upon by all parties
     involved." (SS 101, CT 8488,9; CT 6003)
     
     Heller also stated in his declaration:
          "The contractual non-disclosure provisions were the
     one issue which was not debated by any of the parties or
     attorneys involved." (CT 6003)

     Heller's statements make absolutely clear Scn's intention of
mutuality as it was promised to GA to get him to sign its contract.
The whole of Scn's litigation to enforce what it now claims is a
non-mutual contract, in order to be able to further fair game GA,
is something far more than mere nonperformance, and far more than
what is required to prove Scn's intention not to perform its
promise.

C. There is a Triable Issue as to Justification

     Even, assuming arguendo, that the silence provision only
applied to GA, and that Scn was not required by contract to remain
silent about him, GA was still manifestly justified in speaking out
as soon as Scn did. 

     Scn claims that it can say whatever it wants, no matter how
false or injurious, and GA cannot respond. That is essentially what
Judge Thomas has ruled in ignoring GA's defense of privilege. GA is
justified in responding to protect his reputation, and indeed his
life. This a matter for the trier of fact to decide and cannot be
dispensed with on summary judgment.

     Putting aside defenses and arguments of free speech, freedom
of religion, freedom from slavery, due process and assembly, if Scn
had remained silent about GA, saying no more than that the parties'
litigation was settled in its entirety, and GA had gone public
about his Scn experiences, conceivably Scn could have legally
enforced the SA.

     If, on the other hand, Scn had accused GA of being a serial
chain saw murderer; taken out a full page ad or a hundred full page
ads, in the New York Times, in the Washington Post, and in
Newsweek, all accusing him of being a serial chain saw murderer;
bought a satellite, a daily hour on network TV, and produced a show
called "Gerry Armstrong - Serial Chain Saw Murderer," it is
inconceivable that GA could be judicially prevented from responding
in the media, and to anyone who would listen, in order to defend
his reputation; in order to show that he is not a serial chain saw
murderer and to explain what entity is attacking him and why.

     Somewhere between GA discussing his Scn experiences without
Scn having said anything about GA, and Scn spending a billion to
run its GA serial chain saw murderer black PR campaign, there is a
line crossed where GA becomes justified in breaching his contract
in order to defend his reputation, and his life. It is the line
Judge Breckenridge recognized in the Armstrong I trial when he said
that in 1982, GA, being the target of fair game, was "privileged to
reveal information confidentially acquired by him in the course of
his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself or a
third person." (CT 5952) In 1991, GA was no less fair game's
target, and no less privileged to respond to Scn's attacks, even
though his responses might be, absent Scn's attacks, breaches of
contract.

     That is a line for the trier of fact, in this case, a jury, to
determine. It is a line involving a look at what a reasonable
person would have done. It is a line involving a set of facts
completely ignored by Judge Thomas in his grant of Scn's summary
judgment. If GA's actions were reasonable, then a contract which
prevents them must be unreasonable. It is indeed unreasonable that
GA who had been fair game would continue to be fair game.

     In truth, Scn's post-settlement attacks on GA are more
vilifying, and call for a different, more complete response, than
does a libel like GA being a serial chainsaw murderer. Scn gives
its black PR titles like "False Report Correction," (CT 7598, 7612)
makes it look authoritative by providing many "facts," (CT 7514,5)
or presents it in the form of a sworn affidavit. (CT 6068) Scn's
statements about GA are black PR going beyond his Scn experiences;
e.g., claiming falsely that he posed nude in a newspaper (CT 7514;
7524) or, also falsely, that he has AIDS. (CT 8242; 8676,7) These
are matters to be examined by the jury to determining if GA acted
reasonably in responding as he did, and whether first of all Scn
crossed over the line.

     Sadly, there is sometimes an assumption of guilt in the public
mind when a charge is not responded to. There can be little doubt
that Scn would use GA's failure to respond to its calumnies to
further amplify the illusion of his guilt it manufactured in that
public mind. No one can be compelled to respond to false charges
made to the public, and it is the most courageous man who does not
respond. But no one also can be prevented by human agency from
responding to falsehoods, definitely not by our Courts. GA has been
moved to respond, no matter how uncourageous or dangerous
responding might be, so that this terrible injustice can be seen
and stopped, and perhaps stopped from happening to others.

D. The Settlement Agreement Obstructs Justice

     In his order granting Scn's first motion for summary
adjudication Judge Thomas stated that there was no triable issue
regarding obstruction of justice/suppression of evidence because
the SA does not prohibit GA from disclosing information pursuant to
subpoena or other legal process. (CT 4237) But the fact that the SA
allows GA to testify pursuant to subpoena does not automatically
mean that the SA does not have as its object obstruction of
evidence. The facts of GA's relationship with Scn and other
litigants, particularly Scn's litigant victims (see, e.g., CT
5486,7), and the facts of the uses to which Scn put the SA are
essential to determining whether it obstructed justice. Thus an
examination by the trier of fact is necessary.

     Although instances of the SA acting to obstruct justice
abound, one will serve to show that obstruction is its object. On
February 8, 1994 Scientology leader David Miscavige, filed in the
Scientology v. Fishman case, supra, a declaration (CT 7625.1-65) in
which he attacked GA, claiming, inter alia, that GA advised people
to falsely accuse Scn of criminal acts, that the IRS repudiated
GA's credibility, and that in a police-sanctioned investigation GA
acknowledged his motives were to overthrow Scn leadership and gain
control. (CT 7655,6) On February 22, 1994 GA executed a declaration
correcting the falsehoods in Miscavige's declaration. GA's
declaration was filed in Fishman March 9, 1994 as part of
defendants' pending motion for costs. (CT 5579; 5646) GA appended
to his declaration as an exhibit a public announcement by then LAPD
Chief Daryl Gates that the "authorization" given to Scn agent
Eugene Ingram by police officer Phillip Rodriguez to eavesdrop upon
or record the confidential communications of GA or attorney Flynn
(CT 5641) was invalid and unauthorized and not a correspondence
from the LAPD. (CT 5643)

     It would have been obstructive of the justice the Fishman
defendants were due if GA had not responded and Miscavige's lies
about him had adversely influenced the Judge in the case. That is
exactly what Scn sought with its SA and its judicial enforcement.
It would also have been obstructive of the justice GA was due in
the Fishman case, which is enshrined in the litigant's privilege.
(See opposition to motion for summary adjudication, CT 3886-92) It
would be obstructive of the justice GA is due and every party in
all Courts of California and the United States are due if Scn can
lie when it wants about him and prevent him from responding to
correct its sworn to lies. Since the SA's purpose is to silence GA
so that Scn can say whatever it wants about him, his credibility,
litigation, testimony and character with impunity, including in
legal proceedings, it is obstructive of justice.

     There was no opportunity for the Fishman defendants to
subpoena GA for his testimony to refute Miscavige's charges.
Discovery was closed, and in fact the case had been dismissed, as
can be seen by the fact that GA's declaration concerned defendants'
motion for costs. There are many instances in litigation where
there is neither time nor legal opportunity to take someone's
deposition to obtain testimony to present needed information or
refute presented misinformation. Additionally, requiring one party
in litigation to obtain third party testimony by deposition that he
is prevented from obtaining by declaration only by the opponent's
"contracts," senselessly, but dramatically, runs up litigation
costs. That is one of Scn's tactics and is in itself obstruction of
justice.

      Judge Thomas also stated in his January 27, 1995 order that,
since Scn was not seeking in the causes of action on which it then
sought summary adjudication to prohibit disclosure to government
agencies conducting investigations pursuant to statutory
obligations, GA had not raised a triable issue regarding
obstruction of justice. He went on to state that "even if a portion
of the agreement could be construed to so prohibit (see e.g.,
para.10), plaintiff is not relying on that section, nor and has
defendant shown that the provision is so substantial as to render
the entire contract illegal."(CT 4236-9) But that paragraph
certainly is indicative of the overall object of the SA being the
obstructive of justice, and thus having an illegal objective. The
SA is very clear about assistance to government agencies:
     "[GA] agrees that he will not assist or advise anyone,
     including individuals, partnerships, associations,
     corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any
     claim or engaged in any litigation or involved in or
     contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of
     any entity or class of person (the beneficiaries)"
     
     The fact that the non-assistance to governmental agencies was
itself illegal is evidenced by Judge Thomas's permanent injunction
which expressly excludes "government organ[s] or entit[ies]" from
its prohibitions. If the prohibiting of assistance to government
entities is obstructive of justice and illegal, is not the
prohibiting of assistance to non-government entities equally as
obstructive and equally as illegal? Non-government entities are
equally due justice, perhaps even more due justice than the
government entities, whose responsibility it is to provide justice.

     The purpose of the SA is to tilt the legal playing field in
Scn's favor. This should be declared illegal. For justice to be
obstructed it is not necessary to obstruct the whole justice
system. For justice to be obstructed it is enough for one side to
use any obstruction to gain an unfair advantage. The SA certainly
gains Scn an unfair advantage over GA, and there is much evidence
that the SA gives Scn an unfair advantage over all its litigant
adversaries. (See, e.g., Long affidavits filed in Scn v. Miller,
supra., CT 6011-102) Adding into the legal arena the other SAs
signed by the other settling litigants in December, 1986, including
attorneys, the obstruction becomes gargantuan.

     The obstruction of justice inherent in the SA is compounded by
its judicial enforcement. Because GA filed his declaration in
Fishman, as, pursuant to the litigant's [absolute] privilege, he
should have, to correct Miscavige's lies, Scn added the declaration
as a cause of action in its complaint, and ultimately was awarded
$50,000 in liquidated damages. (CT 5312,3; 8679)

     The SA's obstruction of justice is also compounded by Scn's
proclivity for attempting its enforcement and using it as a threat
in a scope even beyond its already obstructive language. Scn
brought contempt of court charges against GA for 10 alleged
violations of the preliminary injunction issued May 28, 1992 by
Judge Sohigian. (CT 0428-639) These contempts were discharged July
29, 1994. (CT 2690-2) Before he responded to Scn's attacks GA was
threatened by Scn attorney Heller who said that GA could be sued if
he testified, even though he had been subpoenaed in the Corydon
case, and that to prevent his being sued GA should refuse to answer
Corydon's attorney's questions. (CT 5926-8) The trier of fact in
determining whether the SA's object is to obstruct justice must
look at the nature of the entity using it and that entity's
intentions. Judge Thomas did not do this.

     GA again argued that the SA obstructs justice in his
opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion. (CT 8270,1)
Judge Thomas commented merely that the argument had been rejected 
with Scn's first summary adjudication. (CT 8679)

     In his separate statement GA included a statement in a
declaration by Scn member Long that prior to December, 1986 GA had
testified in 15 cases a total of 28 trial days, had been deposed
for 19 days, and had executed 28 declarations in 15 cases all of
which concerned Scn. (SS 135, CT 8520; Long Declaration, CT 7742)
The Court of Appeal in denying GA's appeal from the 5/28/92
injunction stated that it merely restrains, for the time being,
GA's "voluntary intermeddling" in other litigation against Scn. (CT
2049) GA has never intermeddled in those litigations. His testimony
and assistance has been sought by the parties in those cases.
Nothling called him from South Africa (See, e.g., CT 7004); Yanny
called him from Los Angeles (See, e.g., CT 7004); Corydon
subpoenaed him (CT 5990-4); Fishman's attorney put GA on his expert
witness list; Miscavige involved him by filing a false sworn
declaration. (CT 7655,6) 

     The answer to Scn's problem with GA's testimony, and with
anyone's testimony, concerning the discreditable facts about its
nature and activities is not to attempt to suppress or prohibit
that testimony with its illegal SA and to punish GA, or anyone, for
testifying. Scn's answer, if it wishes to escape liability, is to
remove those discreditable facts from its nature and activities so
that there is nothing to be held liable for. When Scn does so,
GA's, and anyone's, testimony regarding discreditable facts will no
longer be relevant and will no longer be sought.

     Indeed it is the vital corrective or reformative function of
the justice system which Scn seeks to avoid or obstruct with its
dependence on its SAs and their enforcement. It is not in the
public interest that the justice system lose its power to bring
about correction and reform by enforcing obstructive contracts
which suppress knowledge of matters truly needing correction and
reform. As Judge Geernaert said when Scn urged him to enforce the
same SA Judge Thomas has enforced: 
          "I know we like to settle cases.  But we don't like
     to settle cases and, in effect, prostrate the court
     system into making an order which is not fair or in the
     public interest." (CT 7700)
Scn seeks to prostrate the court system. The system, on which
everyone depends to prevent injustice, must let Scn, and everyone,
know that it is not for sale and will not be prostrated for any
amount of money.

     It would be obstructive of justice to prevent perceived
obstruction of justice from being reported. If a Court failed to
acknowledge obstruction of justice as obstructive it would be
obstructive to prevent that fact from being reported. If the court
system failed to acknowledge obstruction of justice as obstructive
it would be obstructive to prevent any of those facts from being
reported to the media, to government and to anyone who would
listen. That is the situation here. The reporting of obstruction of
justice cannot be obstructed. The reporting of perceived
obstruction of justice, or any other crime, cannot be prohibited
until such time as the obstruction or other crime is proven. GA has
been unshakable in his conviction that the SA and Scn's enforcement
are obstructive of justice since he first petitioned the Court of
Appeal for permission to respond in the Armstrong I appeal in 1990.
(CT 6119-21) He continues to make the argument the moment these
words are typed. His argument is not without merit. For that reason
alone he cannot be silenced by the obstructive SA, nor by the Marin
Court's enforcement, and it is enough reason for this Court to rule
that there is a triable issue regarding that obstruction.

E. There is a Triable Issue as to the Validity of the Liquidated
Damages Provision

     Judge Thomas stated in his January 27, 1995 order that GA had
failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the liquidated
damages provision is invalid, and that, quoting Civ. Code, 1671,
Subd (b), the law presumes that liquidated damages provisions are
"valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision
establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time the contract was made." Judge
Thomas stated that, although GA states that he was not involved in
negotiating the provision, GA goes on to say that he discussed the
provision with two attorneys before signing the agreement. Judge
Thomas stated that GA clearly knew of the provision yet chose to
sign it, and that GA had not shown that he had unequal bargaining
power, or that he made any efforts to bargain or negotiate with
respect to the provision. Judge Thomas stated that GA pointed to
the fact that other SAs (the Aznarans') contain a $10,000
liquidated damages provision, but that this alone was not
sufficient to raise a triable issue that GA did not show that
circumstances did not change between 12/86 and 4/87 and that the
Aznarans stood in the same or similar position to GA. Judge Thomas
described the same or similar position as being as high up in the
organization and able to cause as much damage by speaking out
against Scn, or having access to as much information as GA.

     It is up to the trier of fact to decide what all the
circumstances were at the time the SA was presented to GA for
signing and whether the liquidated damages provision was
unreasonable under those circumstances. The circumstances at the
time and leading up to that time were complex, and involved many
people and many complex legal and personal relationships. GA
presented more than sufficient evidence to raise a question
concerning the unreasonableness of the liquidated damages, and
Judge Thomas erred in his grant of summary adjudication.

     In his opposition to Scn's second summary adjudication motion
GA again argued the unenforceability of the liquidated damages
provision. (CT 8244-50; SS 41-88, CT 8324-40) GA provided the
deposition testimony of two Flynn "clients," Nancy Rodes and
Michael Douglas, both of whom signed similar SAs to that signed by
GA. Each of their SAs contained a $50,000 liquidated damages
provision. Rodes and Douglas each were paid $7,500 to settle their
claims. (SS 55,6, CT 8329,30; SS 63,4, CT 8331,2; Deposition
transcript of Michael Douglas, CT 7702-10; Deposition transcript of
Nancy Rodes, CT 7716; "Mutual Release Agreement," CT 7732-40) Rodes
testified that she had been told by Flynn that the "settlement
agreement" is "not really enforceable...no legal document can
really take away your rights." She testified that in her decision
to sign she relied "to a fairly large extent" on Flynn's telling
her that he thought the provisions with respect to maintaining
silence were not enforceable. (SS 57-60, CT 7726)

     GA provided his own testimony that the liquidated damages
provision was unreasonable at the time because it applied to over
seventeen years of his life, about which it was impossible for him
to be silent. On its face the SA did not permit GA to communicate
his experiences to a doctor, lawyer, girlfriend, counselor,
minister, or any agency of the government; or face a $50,000
penalty. (SS 44, CT 8325; 8218) Scn was not intending to honor its
promise to cease fair game but was intending to subject GA and his
friends to more attacks including publishing its own untrue and
perverse accounts of his history. (SS 45, CT 8326; 8218,9) Scn's 
intention is shown by the fact that immediately after the
settlement it provided its account of GA's history and documents
concerning him to at least the Los Angeles Times, and shortly
thereafter to at least the London Sunday Times. (SS 46, CT 8326;
8218) Since Scn knew that it was going to continue to fair game GA
after the settlement, continue the public controversy, and very
possibly draw GA into that controversy in order to defend his
reputation, it was patently unreasonable to require of him a
$50,000 per utterance liquidated damages provision in Scn's SA.

     GA testified that the unreasonableness of the liquidated
damages provision is clearly demonstrated by the way Flynn dealt
with it. When GA protested the provision and the impossibility of
being silent about his seventeen years of experiences, Flynn said,
"It's not worth the paper it's printed on;" "it's unenforceable."
Flynn also said that "[Scn] won't change it." For that reason and
that reason alone there was no discussion of the liquidated damages
provision beyond that point. (SS 52, CT 8328; 8219-20) GA saw the
liquidated damages provision at the time of the settlement as
stupid, cruel and diabolic. Flynn said "It's not worth the paper
it's printed on;" but "[Scn] won't change it." Armstrong was left
with only one option: if Scn wants to keep the stupid, cruel and
diabolic provision in its unenforceable SA, so be it. (SS 53, CT
8328,9; 8220)

     GA testified that Scn had not been damaged in any way
monetarily by any statement he had made at any time prior to the
settlement; that there was no relationship between actual damages
sustained by Scn and the amount of the liquidated damages; that all
the money Scn spent on litigation concerning GA has been to further
its fair game goals in violation of his basic human and civil
rights, not on repairing damage he has done. (SS 49-51, CT 8327,8;
8219)

     GA testified that he had an utterly unequal bargaining power
at the time of the settlement and yet made a sincere effort to
address the provision and negotiate, only to be told by Flynn "it's
not worth the paper it's printed on. GA was positioned by Flynn and
Scn as a "deal breaker."  He was flown to Los Angeles from Boston
without seeing one word of the SA, and after Flynn's other clients
had been brought to Los Angeles. He was told by Flynn that Scn
would continue to subject GA, all Flynn's clients, and Flynn
himself to fair game unless GA signed. (SS 67,8, CT 8335,6; 8220,1)

     GA testified that Scn had millions of dollars, a formidable
litigation machine in place and operating, and GA's own attorney
intimidated and compromised. (SS 71, CT 8337; 8221) Flynn's co-
counsel in GA's case, Julia Dragojevic, was not representing his
interests, but was going along with whatever deal Flynn obtained
from Scn. (SS 70, CT 8446, 8221)

     Flynn's statement that "it's not worth the paper it's printed
on" was not a shock to GA because he had been required to sign
similar "non-disclosure" documents with liquidated damages
provisions while inside Scn, and Flynn had stated many times to him
that such documents were "not worth the paper they were printed
on."  These documents were also found to be unenforceable by the
Court in Armstrong I. (SS 73, CT 8337,8; 8221; CT 6030)

     If Flynn had stated or even implied at the 1986 settlement
that the liquidated damages provision was valid and enforceable GA
would never have signed. (SS 74, CT 8338; 8221) It is ironic that,
although Flynn did not properly represent GA's interests, and in
fact succumbed to the point of acting as Scn's agent, he was
truthful in his representation that the liquidated damages
provision was not worth the paper was printed on. It still isn't.

     In his October 6 order granting Scn summary adjudication Judge
Thomas stated regarding the liquidated damages provision that GA's
evidence regarding Flynn's failure to represent him was not based
on person knowledge. (CT 8679) GA's evidence of Flynn's failure to
represent him was of course based on person knowledge. GA was
there, spoke with Flynn, and had many personal dealings with Flynn
before and after the settlement. GA was the client, and Flynn's
employee. Flynn's non-representation is also evidenced by the SA
itself, and his signing side deals with Scn.

     Judge Thomas stated that GA's evidence did not raise a
reasonable inference of unequal bargaining power, and that he had
no personal knowledge of Scn's wealth. (CT 8679) But GA did have
personal knowledge of Scn and its wealth and power, having been
inside for over twelve years, much of that near the organization's
top. He also had personal knowledge of its litigation machine and
fair game, from his intelligence position inside Scn, because he
was himself a fair game target, and because he had worked with
Flynn in the Scn litigation.

     Judge Thomas also stated that Rodes' and Douglas's signing SAs
with the same liquidated damages amount as GA did not raise an
inference that the provision was unreasonable. (CT 8679) But the
Rodes and Douglas SAs do raise an inference of unreasonability.
They were paid $7,500 and yet had the same liquidated damages
figure in their SAs, $50,000 per utterance. Rodes, like GA, was
told by Flynn that the provision was unenforceable. Scn makes much
of GA's being paid over $500,000 to settle his case. In truth it is
irrelevant what Scn paid GA to settle his cross-complaint, or for
anything else. It did not know what it was paying him since the
amount of the settlement was confidential between Flynn and his
clients. (CT 117,8) The issue is whether the liquidated damages
provision was unreasonable if GA had been paid $0. Did the fact
that GA was paid $500,000 mean that his cross-complaint was valued
at $492,500 and his silence was worth $7,500? Or did it mean that
GA knew 65 times as many discreditable things about Scn as Rodes
and Douglas? 

     In his January 27, 1995 order Judge Thomas had stated that the
disparity between the Aznarans' liquidated damages of $10,000 and
GA's of $50,000 had to do with changing circumstances between 12/86
and 4/87, or how high up in the organization they were relative to
GA, or whether they were able to able to cause as much damage by
speaking out against Scn, or had access to as much information as
he did. (CT 4236) The only fact that is absolutely clear when
examining the 6 documents containing liquidated damages provisions
filed in this case is that there is a triable issue regarding the
circumstances at the time of GA signing of the subject SA
containing the liquidated damages provision, and consequently a
triable issue regarding its validity.

F. The Settlement Agreement Violates Freedom of Speech 

     In his opposition to Scn's motion for summary adjudication of
its twentieth cause of action, GA argued that what Scn sought with
its SA and its enforcement was to impermissibly prohibit his
Constitutionally guaranteed First Amendment rights. (CT 8272,3)
Judge Thomas's ruling on GA's presented defense was incredibly
clipped: "First Amendment: First Amendment rights may be waived by
contract. (See ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989)214
Cal.App.3d 307, 319.)" (CT 8680)

     But Dooley concerns an employee's agreement not to disclose
confidential information. It is not at all similar to the situation
in this case. None of the information GA possessed was
confidential. Indeed, Judge Breckenridge stated in his decision,
affirmed on appeal: 
     "[GA] and his counsel are free to speak or communicate
     upon any of [GA's} recollections or his life as a
     Scientologist or the contents of any exhibit received in
     evidence or marked for identification and not
     specifically ordered sealed." (CT 5950)
The Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision also refused Scn's
effort to have the record on appeal sealed. (CT 6903) All of what
GA has to say is already a matter of public record, and in no way
confidential to anyone.

     This case is different from Dooley because it involves, not
confidential information learned on a job, but GA's experiences,
now over a 28 year period, with an organization which has subjected
him, and continues to subject him, to the nightmare that goes by
the name fair game. This case is profoundly different from Dooley
because it involves the unthinkable concept of Scn being able to
say whatever it wants about GA, in exercise of its free speech
right and in furtherance of its fair game doctrine, while he may
not exercise his free speech right to defend himself. Pursuant to
the SA and the permanent injunction, every Scientologist, every Scn
lawyer and every Scn agent can say whatever they want about GA and
he may not respond. Dooley does not support such an obnoxious idea.

     That "First Amendment [free speech] rights may be waived by
contract" does not mean that all free speech rights may be waived
by contract. As with all contracts, a contract waiving the very
basic right of free speech must be reasonable, and must be legal.
There is a limit, and that is a limit to be decided by the trier of
fact, not hidden away with the gloss that first amendment rights
may be waived by contract.

     Could the US require, in order to settle a case, that a person
never again mention this great nation? Unless of course subpoenaed?
Could California require to settle a case, or for any reason, that
a person never again mention this great state? Or rather, would any
court consider enforcing such "contracts?"

     Could a court enforce a contract requiring that a person not
discuss the Republicans? The Democrats? The Communists? Politics?
Would any court entertain a lawsuit to collect on a $50,000
liquidated damages provision in such a contract? If free speech
rights can be waived by contract, could a court enforce a contract
someone signed, perhaps because his attorney told him it was not
worth the paper it was printed on, in which he agreed to not speak
at all, about anything? 

     No. There must be a limit to what speech can be contracted
away. Here, GA has been sued 5 times, driven into bankruptcy,
driven from his job, black PRed and pilloried. The purpose of the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech is to provide a defense
for all citizens from such things, and indeed to prevent them from
happening.

     It is perhaps acceptable that Scn pays people, or even
contracts with them for their silence. It is, however, completely
unacceptable and impermissible for our Courts to enforce such
contracts. When Courts cease such enforcement, Scn will perhaps
cease its determination to silence people and its determination to
rewrite history. The people will then get what they are owed in
order to make informed choices which is their due: the free flow of
truthful information.

G. The Settlement Agreement Violates the Thirteenth Amendment

     Slavery is a state in which the slave is subject to a master
and does not have the recourse to defenses available to free men.
GA is subject to Scn's fair game abuse and pursuant to the SA, and
now the permanent injunction, GA may not respond. Scn and the Marin
Court have acted to dispossess GA of the right to defend himself
that free men possess. Scn is using the Courts to make and keep GA
its punching bag and slave. 

     The Thirteenth Amendment made slavery illegal in the United
States. At the end of the twentieth century, clever lawyers in the
employ of an entity that would enslave people, have found a way to
reinstitute it. Psychological peonage is still peonage. Attorney
Flynn did not have the legal right to sell GA into slavery, and Scn
does not have the legal right to keep him there. The SA and all
such "contracts" should be seen for the instruments of slavery they
are, and struck down summarily.

H. The Settlement Agreement Violates Freedom of Religion 

     Scn claims to be a religion, and claims all the extraordinary
benefits conferred by the Constitution on religions. It claims that
it is organized solely for religious purposes and that its policies
and bulletins are "scriptures." (SS 138-143, CT 8522-4; revised by-
laws, CT 7746, 7748,9)

     It is axiomatic that there is no freedom of religion where
there is no freedom to criticize, oppose or reform religion.  The
US was founded in great part by people fleeing "religious
persecution" for opposing, criticizing or seeking to reform a
religion which had the power, often provided by the State, to
persecute them. The US recognized the need for its citizens to be
free from religious persecution in the Religious Expression and
Religious Establishment Clauses in the First Amendment to the
Constitution. 

     Religious expression in the US has traditionally only been
limited by an overriding State interest or need; e.g., to maintain
peace, safety or morality. It is not permitted to destroy a fellow
citizen as an expression of one's religion. It is not permitted
religious expression to yell "hell fire" in a crowded theater. It
is not permitted to enter private property, to wiretap, to steal,
or to commit fraud, although called for in one's religious
"scriptures." 

     The prohibition against the State's establishment of a
religion has traditionally been interpreted to mean that no
religion will be favored or given more support by government than
any other religion.  Christianity and Christians, Buddhism and
Buddhists, and Scientology and Scientologists will be treated by
government and all its branches in every way equally.  Also anti-
christians, anti-buddhists and anti-scientologists will be treated
in every way equally.

     With its SAs Scn is attempting to suppress and eliminate
criticism; as well as opposition and reformation efforts.  Any
court's enforcement of Scn's SA necessarily involves the State in
one religion's suppression and elimination of criticism. Judicial
enforcement also results in the promotion and establishment of Scn
by the removal of opposition to promotion and establishment. Unless
the State is also willing to become involved in and support every
other religion's suppression or elimination of criticism, it may
not assist Scn in its campaign. 

     It is, however, inconceivable that any US Court would
prosecute someone who under any circumstances signed a contract
which required that he not discuss God, Jesus Christ, the Holy
Bible, or his experiences in the Christian religion; or for that
matter Allah, Islam, Mohammed, the Koran, the Vedas, Krishna, or
Xenu. Scn must learn that no Court will or may prosecute someone
for breaking one of its unholy contracts which requires that he not
discuss L. Ron Hubbard, Scn, Scientologists, Scn scriptures and the
person's experiences in that religion.

     It is inconceivable that a Christian church in the US would do
what Scn has done to silence its critics. But even Christianity,
although it would never silence anyone about itself, must not be
given the opportunity. Therefore Scn's efforts to silence its
critics and prevent discussion of itself must not be given judicial
support. Its SAs must be ruled to be judicially unenforceable.

      The acceptance of criticism, opposition and calls for reform
must be the natural balance to the extraordinary benefits conferred
on religions. Scn chose to call itself a religion, and, when it did
so, in this country, it also had to accept its critics' freedom to
criticize it without State intervention.

     Scn's SA impermissibly creates a religious discrimination by
prohibiting GA from assisting anyone adverse to its, a religion's,
interests. If such a contractual, and now judicially enforced,
prohibition of help is legal along religious lines, it could be
equally as legal along racial lines, or political, or sexual. But
no court would consider enforcing a contract which required non-
assistance to Chinese people, Conservatives, or women. No court
should also consider enforcing Scn's contract.

     It is abundantly clear in the reading of the complete record
(and GA prays that this Court will take the time to do so) that GA
has believed throughout this litigation in the existence of God.
(See, e.g., GA 6/21/91 letter, CT 7482-98) It clear that he has
come to believe that his being involved in this case, and indeed
all of his persecution by Scn, is for God's Purpose. (See, e.g., SS
146-156, CT 8525-39; 5894-923) It is also clear that he sees fair
game as a terrible evil, and sees Scn's SAs and their enforcement
as part of that evil.

     The Holy Bible is certainly clear that God is intimately
involved with man, religion and justice. He sends His prophets to
decry injustice. The Court cannot say that GA is not guided by God. 
If GA had done something to disturb the peace or threaten public
safety, the State can act against him. But here there is no
question of peace, safety or morality; there is only a person
speaking out to decry injustice, to decry what he sees as a real
threat to peace, safety and morality. There is only a person
speaking his thoughts. No US Court can say these are not God's
thoughts. GA's words are religious expression about a religion, and
they must be left completely free of State control.

     By the direction of God or not this Court has the opportunity
to do a great work and eliminate a great evil. It is great not
because GA is great, but because the freedom of every person to
freely express his conscience, freely tell the truth and freely
help any of his fellows is great.

IV. CONCLUSION  

     Nothing calls out for the enforcement of Scn's SA but the
voice of vindictiveness. Justice calls out for nonenforcement. GA
performed fairly; he dismissed his suit and gave Scientology the
criticism-free opportunity it said it wanted in order to reform.
Scn says it paid for peace. But there is no peace if one side
continues to be attacked. Scn performed unfairly. It still has the
opportunity to reform and embrace fairness. GA asks this Court to
reject the Judgment in this case and do Justice to bring
Scientology to take this opportunity.

     Respectfully submitted, 
     Dated August 25, 1997




Gerry


Copyright © Gerry Armstrong - All Rights Reserved.